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 We provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be strongly 
implementable under the assumption that all agents are partially honest.  
 No Maskin-monotonicity type condition is utilized. 
 With partial honesty, the man-optimal (or woman-optimal) stable solution in pure 
matching problems and the Nash bargaining solution in probabilistic cake-cutting 
environment become strongly implementable. 
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Abstract
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be imple-
mentable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents,
that is, agents who break ties in favor of a truthful message when they face indif-
ference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of
Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak
Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality
and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result
in pure matching and bargaining environments.
JEL classification: D71, D78.
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1. Introduction
Implementation theory studies the relationship between social goals and insti-
tutions1. Specifically, it aims to examine the effect of institutional design to the
attainment of socially desirable outcomes. For example, suppose that a group of
people have agreed on the desirable social outcomes as a function of their prefer-
ences. How can they make sure that they can indeed obtain those outcomes, when
some or all of them may potentially benefit by misrepresenting their preferences?
They thus have to rely on designing an institution (in other words, mechanism or
game form) through which they will interact, that will ensure the optimality of
the outcomes reached through this interaction. More formally, for any collective
choice rule that assigns some socially optimal outcomes as a function of individual
preferences, implementation is achieved when, for any profile of preferences, the
∗Email address: f.savva.2@research.gla.ac.uk
1For a comprehensive survey of the main results in the literature of implementation theory
see Jackson (2001).
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set of socially optimal outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes attained in the
equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism.
While most of the classic literature on the subject relies on the assumption that
agents have a purely consequentialist nature, that is, they only care about the final
outcomes, the strand of behavioural implementation theory typically assumes that
agents may also have procedural concerns. One recent subfield in particular, takes
into account the fact that agents may have an intrinsic preference for honesty.
This weak honesty motive is usually modelled in the following manner: Suppose
that an agent is indifferent between two outcomes. Then she will strictly prefer
to obtain an outcome with a truthful message rather than with an untruthful
one. This type of rationale is typically referred to as partial honesty or minimal
honesty and can be supported by the experimental findings of Hurkens and Kartik
(2009) for example, who show that subjects either are always honest, or tend to
lie only when they gain by doing so. Despite being rather weak, partial honesty is
shown to bear a significant positive effect for the set of implementable rules and
limitations imposed by Maskin-monotonicity2 in paticular. In their seminal paper,
Dutta and Sen (2012) show that in the presence of at least one partially honest
agent in the society, Maskin-monotonicity is no longer a necessary condition for
Nash implementation and No Veto Power alone becomes sufficient for three or
more agents.
Overall, the results on Nash implementation with partial honesty have been
positive. An important question that remains unanswered though is whether these
possibilities can be extended to other, possibly stronger, equilibrium concepts.
For example, in many situations, the social planner cannot exclude the possibility
of pre play communication between the agents and thus the mechanism may be
vulnerable to group deviations. In such settings the natural solution concept to
use is strong Nash equilibrium3 a` la Aumann (1960), that is robust to deviations
by any possible coalition of agents.
The current paper identifies sufficient conditions for strong implementation
when all agents are partially honest. Instead of a full characterization, we chose
to follow the work of Korpela (2013) in providing simple sufficient conditions that
have a more intuitive appeal and are generally easier to check in applications.
First, we identify sufficient conditions for strong implementation when all agents
are partially honest and prove their sufficiency. Specifically, we show that if a social
2Maskin (1999) in his seminal paper identified a condition now known as Maskin-monotonicity
as necessary and almost sufficient for Nash implementation. It roughly says that if an optimal
outcome at some state does not fall in even one person’s ranking when switching to another
state, then it should still be selected as optimal. A formal definition will be given later.
3From now on we will use the terms strong equilibrium and strong Nash equilibrium inter-
changably. The same applies for the respective implementation concepts.
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choice rule satisfies Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Universally Worst Alterna-
tive (UWA) and Weak Pareto Dominance (WPD), then it can be implemented in
strong equilibrium. In this way we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela
(2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason (ASR). Our new condition, WPD
roughly requires the following to be true: if an outcome a is optimal at some state,
and if there exists another outcome b, such that all agents weakly prefer b to a with
at least one agent being indifferent between them, then b must be optimal as well.
WPD is implied by ASR, therefore our condition is weaker. Next, we provide two
applications of our results, in bargaining and pure matching environments. More
specifically, we show that the man-optimal (or woman-optimal) solution in a pure
matching environment as well as the Nash bargaining solution in a cake-cutting
environment are both strongly implementable, when agents are partially honest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we review the
relevant literature. In section 3, we present the basic implementation setting and
formal definitions. In section 4, we provide the definitions of our conditions, our
main theorem and some additional results. Section 5 consists of our two applica-
tions. Finally, in section 6 we conclude by discussing our results and providing
some points for further research. The proof of our main theorem is in the appendix.
2. Related Literature
The problem of strong implementation has primarily been studied by Maskin
(1979). Moulin and Peleg (1982) provide some results on the same issue with the
use of effectivity functions. A complete characterization of strongly implementable
social choice rules is due to Dutta and Sen (1991). Suh (1996) generalizes the lat-
ter result by allowing the planner to possibly exclude some coalition formation ex
ante, so in this more general setting not all coalitions are feasible. If the plan-
ner though cannot obtain such information, the relevant implementation concept
is double implementation in Nash and strong equilibrium. Suh (1997) provides
general results in this case as well. While complete characterizations are of high
theoretical significance, they can be hard to apply to more specific settings. This
motivates the more recent work by Korpela (2013) to identify simple sufficient
conditions for strong implementation.
On the issue of partial honesty in implementation, the pioneering work of Dutta
and Sen (2012) shows that No Veto Power (NVP) alone becomes sufficient for
Nash implementation in the presence of at least one partially honest agent4. Their
results are generalized by Lombardi and Yoshihara (2017b), who provide a full
characterization of Nash implementable rules in the presence of partial honesty,
4In contrast with the case of no partial honesty, where NVP along with Maskin-monotonicity
are sufficient. The well-known result is due to Maskin (1999).
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for both unanimous and non-unanimous social choice rules. In more applied set-
tings, Kartik et al. (2014) focus on environments with economic interest and iden-
tify sufficient conditions for implementation in two rounds of iterative deletion of
strictly dominated strategies by “simple” mechanisms, without utilizing the usual
canonical mechanisms5. On restricted domains with private goods, Doghmi and
Ziad (2013) provide more positive results for Nash implementation. In other solu-
tion concepts with complete information, Saporiti (2014) shows that with partial
honesty strategy-proofness is necessary and sufficient for secure implementation,
which essentially requires implementation in dominant strategies and Nash equi-
librium. Hagiwara (2017) also shows that NVP is sufficient with at least one, and
unanimity is sufficient with at least two partially honest agents for double imple-
mentation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria. Finally, the limitations of
partial honesty in Nash implementation are outlined in Lombardi and Yoshihara
(2018) who explore under which conditions partially honest Nash implementation
is equivalent to Nash implementation, and in Adachi (2017).
Partial honesty can yield positive results in incomplete information environ-
ments as well. For example, Matsushima (2008) shows that incentive compatibility
is sufficient for implementation in strong iterative dominance and Korpela (2014)
proves that incentive compatibility and NVP are sufficient for implementation in
Bayes Nash equilibrium. Studies with alternative solution concepts include Ortner
(2015), who provides more positive results with partial honesty in fault-tolerant
Nash equilibrium6 and stochastically stable equilibrium.
The issue of implementation with partial honesty nevertheless can be put in
the broader context of implementation with motives, where it is typically assumed
that agents may also give significance to motives as procedural concerns, apart
from the final outcomes. Along this line of research, it is worth mentioning a con-
cept related to partial honesty, namely that of “social responsibility”. In Lombardi
and Yoshihara (2017a), the effect of social responsibility is explored with regards
to natural implementation7. Hagiwara et al. (2017) utilize a similar concept of
social responsibility for strategy space reduction with an outcome mechanism for
5Jackson (1992) criticizes the use of canonical mechanisms in implementation theory as too
permissive due to their unbounded strategy spaces. Instead, he derives a necessary condition
for implementation with bounded mechanisms in undominated strategies. In the same context,
Mukherjee et al. (2017) provide a full characterization when all agents are partially honest.
6Fault-tolerant Nash equilibrium was first introduced in the implementation literature by
Eliaz (2002) as an equilibrium concept which is robust to the bounded rationality of a number
of agents.
7Specifically, they show that the Walrasian correspondence, although it violates Maskin-
monotonocity, can be implemented via a market-type mechanism, where agents announce prices
and consumption bundles. Like in the case of Kartik et al. (2014), no tail-chasing construction
is used.
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Nash implementation. In a different environment, Dog˘an (2017) shows that the
unique socially optimal allocation of objects to agents can be Nash implemented,
when at least three agents have a social responsibility motive. Some general re-
sults on motives as tie-breaking rules with regards to Nash implementation are in
Kimya (2017). Other significant contributions to the literature of motives in im-
plementation include Glazer and Rubinstein (1998), Corcho´n and Herrero (2004)
and Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016).
3. Preliminaries
Our society consists of a finite set of individuals N = {1, ..., n} with |N | = n ≥
3. By C ⊆ N we will denote a coalition of agents. The set of all possible social
outcomes is denoted by A and we typically assume that |A| ≥ 2. Each agent i
is endowed with a preference ordering (complete, reflexive and transitive binary
relation) over A that is denoted by Ri. We denote the set of all such possible
orderings for i by Ri and, as usual, by Pi and Ii we denote the asymmetric and
symmetric part of Ri respectively. Define R ≡ ×i∈NRi with a typical element
R = (R1, ..., Rn) which we call a preference profile or simply, state. For each i ∈ N
let Li(a,R) = {b ∈ A|aRib} be agent i’s lower contour set of outcome a in state
R. A social choice rule (SCR) f is a correspondence f : R ⇒ A such that for all
R ∈ R, ∅ 6= f(R) ⊆ A. A social choice function (SCF) is a single-valued SCR. For
any R ∈ R, we call f(R) the set of f -optimal outcomes in state R.
A mechanism G is a pair (S, g), which consists of a strategy space S = ×i∈NSi,
with Si being the set of available strategies for each i ∈ N , and an outcome function
g : S → A, that maps each strategy profile s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S to an outcome in
A. As usual, let (s′i, s−i) be the strategy profile where agent i plays the strategy s
′
i
while all j 6= i play sj. In a similar manner, let (s′C , sN\{C}) be the strategy profile
where all i ∈ C play s′i, and all j ∈ N \ C play sj. We also define the range of a
mechanism G as g(S) = {a ∈ A|a = g(s) for some s ∈ S}. Now let Γ be the set of
all possible mechanisms, and Γ∗ = {G ∈ Γ|g(S) = A}, that is, Γ∗ is the set of all
mechanisms whose range is equal to the set of social outcomes. Any mechanism
G with a preference profile R define a normal form game (G,R). We focus on the
case of complete information where the state R is common knowledge among the
agents, while not to the planner.
In our setting, we assume that agents do not only care about the social out-
comes, but also give some importance (although small) to the procedure that leads
to those outcomes. More specifically, we assume that agents are partially honest
in the following sense: If an agent is indifferent between two outcomes and she
can attain those outcomes with two different strategies with one being “honest”
and the other being “dis-honest”, then she strongly prefers to follow the honest
strategy. More formally, for honesty to be meaningful in our setting, we should
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restrict the set of possible mechanisms such that the strategy set of each i ∈ N
is Si = R ×Mi. That is, each agent is required to announce a preference profile
R ∈ R and an arbitrary message mi ∈ Mi. Then, given a mechanism G, for
any i ∈ N we define i’s truthful correspondence as TGi : R⇒ Si such that for each
agent i, state R and message mi, T
G
i (R) = {R}×Mi. The truthful correspondence
represents the truthful strategies for each agent i in state R, which essentially con-
sist of announcing the “true” state. We now define agent i’s extended preferences
on the strategy space S as follows. Given a vector of truthful correspondences
TG = (TG1 , ..., T
G
n ), for all i ∈ N and R ∈ R, define Ri as a complete, transitive
and reflexive binary relation on S. An extended preference profile in state R is
denoted by R= (R1 , ...,Rn ). We are now ready to proceed to the formal defini-
tion of partial honesty.
Given a mechanism G, an agent i is partially honest if ∀si, s′i ∈ Si,∀s−i ∈ S−i:
• [si ∈ TGi (R), s′i /∈ TGi (R) and g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i)]⇒ (si, s−i) Ri (s′−i, s−i).
• In all other cases, g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i) ⇐⇒ (si, s−i) Ri (s′−i, s−i)
An agent i is not partially honest if ∀si, s′i ∈ Si, ∀s−i ∈ S−i:
• g(si, s−i)Rig(s′i, s−i) ⇐⇒ (si, s−i) Ri (s′−i, s−i)
In other words, an agent cares about honesty in a lexicographic manner: First
she “consults” her ordering over outcomes, and if she is indifferent between some,
she consults her ordering over strategies, strongly preferring the honest strategies
if they exist. That is, her partial honesty serves the purpose of a tie-breaking rule
when she faces indifference. On the other hand, an agent that is not partially
honest cares only about the outcomes and does not give any significance to her
strategies.
Notice that a mechanism G with an extended preference profile R in state R
define an (extended) game in normal form (G,R). Finally, we assume that in
our society there can be partially honest and not partially honest agents and we
denote the set of partially honest agents by H. For the planner however, we only
assume that he knows the class of all conceivable sets of partially honest agents,
H ⊆ 2N \ {∅}, without knowing which set is the actual one.
Regarding the solution concept, since we assume that players are allowed to
collude, the equilibrium notion that we use is strong equilibrium. Formally, s ∈ S
is a strong equilibrium in the game (S, g,R), if for all C ⊆ N and s′C ∈ SC ,
there exists an agent i ∈ C such that (sC , sN\C) Ri (s′C , sN\C). In other words, a
strategy profile is a strong equilibrium if there is no coalition that can deviate from
it and make all of its members strictly better off. Let the set of strong equilibria
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of (S, g,R) be SE(G,R) = {s ∈ S|s is a strong equilibrium in (G,R)}. We
say that mechanism G implements the SCR f in strong equilibrium, if in any
state R ∈ R, g(SE(G,R)) = f(R), that is, if in any state, the set of outcomes
obtained through the strong equilibria of the extended game coincides with the
set of socially optimal outcomes. The SCR f is strongly implementable if there
exists a mechanism that implements it in strong equilibrium.
The previous formal setting can be interpreted as follows. First of all, the SCR
represents the collective choice rule that our society utilizes in order to make collec-
tive decisions. It can also be interpreted as the constitution of the society designed
in an ex ante stage. A mechanism on the other hand represents the institution
through which the agents in the society interact with each other, that is, it deter-
mines the rules and the outcomes of the interaction. A hypothetical benevolent
social planner wishes to implement the SCR, however, he does not know the true
state, hence, he relies on the agents in order to obtain this information. On the
other hand, truthful revelation of the state may not be in the best interests of some
agents. Therefore, the goal of the social planner is to construct a mechanism that
will lead to the optimal according to the SCR outcome, for any realization of the
agents’ preferences, that is, for any preference profile. For the strong implemen-
tation of the SCR we thus require any optimal outcome to be attainable by some
strong equilibrium and any strong equilibrium to lead to an optimal outcome.
4. Results
In this section, we present our main results. Before proceeding though, it would
be helpful first to review the result of Korpela (2013). This will enable us to outline
more clearly the weakening of the sufficient conditions for strong implementation
when we adopt the partial honesty assumption. The conditions are the following:
Holocaust Alternative (HA): ∃aH ∈ A, such that:
• ∀R ∈ R, aH /∈ f(R), and,
• ∀R ∈ R,∀a ∈ A \ {aH}, a /∈ Li(aH , R).
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO): ∀R ∈ R, f(R) ⊆ wPO(A,R), where
wPO(A,R) = {a ∈ A|@b ∈ A such that ∀i ∈ N, bPia}.
Axiom of Sufficient Reason (ASR): ∀R,R′ ∈ R,∀a ∈ f(R),∀b ∈ A:
∀i ∈ N,Li(a,R) ⊆ Li(b, R′)⇒ b ∈ f(R′).
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Intuitively, one can imagine HA as the worst alternative for all agents in any
state, that cannot ever be selected as an optimal outcome. It is a significant
restriction on the preference domain, however, it is meaningful in various appli-
cations. It essentially allows us to overcome more involved conditions such as
Condition γ of Dutta and Sen (1991). WPO restricts the range of the SCR to
weakly Pareto optimal outcomes. It is well-known from Maskin (1979) that weak
Pareto optimality in the range of the mechanism is also a necessary condition for
strong implementation.
ASR can be interpreted as follows: Let an outcome a be selected as f -optimal
for some preference profile R. Now imagine an outcome b and profile R′ such that
for all agents, every outcome that was ranked weakly below a in R is also ranked
weakly below b in R′. Then, b should be f -optimal in R′. In other words, if every
reason for a to be f -optimal in R is also a reason for b to be f -optimal in R′, and
a is indeed selected as an optimal outcome in R, then b should be selected as an
optimal outcome in R′ as well. It is useful to note that ASR is stronger than
Maskin-monotonicity (MON) and Unanimity (U) as it implies both. We review
the formal definitions below:
Maskin-Monotonicity (MON): ∀R,R′ ∈ R,∀i ∈ N, ∀a ∈ f(R):
∀i ∈ N,Li(a,R) ⊆ Li(a,R′)⇒ a ∈ f(R′).
Unanimity (U): ∀R ∈ R, ∀a ∈ A:
∀i ∈ N,A ⊆ Li(a,R)⇒ a ∈ f(R).
For example, note that we obtain MON if in the definition of ASR we set
b = a. To see that it implies U, suppose that ASR holds, and for some state R
and outcome a we have that for all i, A ⊆ Li(a,R). Then, for any state R′ and
any outcome c ∈ f(R′) it trivially holds that for all i, Li(c, R′) ⊆ A ⊆ Li(a,R),
and from ASR, a ∈ f(R) is obtained. We are now ready to present Korpela’s
theorem:
Theorem 1 (Korpela, 2013). If a SCR f satisfies HA, WPO and ASR then it
is strongly implementable.
Theorem 1 makes no assumptions with regards to the partial honesty motive.
Its significance lies on the simplicity and intuitive appeal of the conditions. Now
proceeding to our results, we will utilize the following assumption that summarizes
the knowledge of the social planner with regards to the number of partially honest
agents in the society.
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Assumption 1: All agents in N are partially honest and the planner knows that.
Assumption 1 has been extensively used in implementation problems. Ex-
amples include Kartik and Tercieux (2012), Korpela (2014), Matsushima (2008),
Mukherjee et al. (2017), Ortner (2015) and Saporiti (2014). As in the case of the
Dutta and Sen (2012) in Nash implementation, our goal is to examine the effect
of the presence of partially honest agents on the strong implementation problem.
Moreover, we aim to determine whether partial honesty bears analogous signifi-
cant impact in the case of strong implementation as in Nash implementation, given
that the sufficient conditions for the former are much stronger than in the case of
the latter. In fact, by assuming that all agents are partially honest we manage
to derive sharp and significant results. For our first result, we identify sufficient
conditions for strong implementation when all agents are partially honest. Our
key condition is the following8:
Weak Pareto Dominance (WPD): ∀R ∈ R, ∀a ∈ f(R),∀b ∈ A, if:
• ∃j ∈ N, aIjb, and
• ∀i ∈ N \ {j}, bRia,
then b ∈ f(R).
The intuition behind our condition is the following: Suppose that a is an f -
optimal outcome at state R. Then, if there exists an outcome b such that everyone
weakly prefers b to a, with at least one agent being indifferent between them,
then b must be selected as f -optimal as well9. Another way to look at WPD
is as an “expansion” of the set of socially optimal outcomes in each state, so as
to include all unanimously weakly preferred, or indifferent outcomes. The latter
interpretation also has a strong normative appeal. Notice that WPD is implied
by ASR. To see this simply set R = R′ in the definition of ASR which makes
WPD true. Another interesting fact with regards to WPD is that together with
WPO, it implies U, which will prove to be particularly useful in our main result.
This is stated formally in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. If a SCR f satisfies WPO and WPD, then it satisfies U.
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee for motivating us to pursue a weakening of the
condition that we initially presented in our working paper.
9In general, we can exclude the possibility of a being strictly Pareto dominated by b by the
WPO condition which, apart from using it as part of our sufficient condition, we also show it
to be necessary for partially honest strong implementation in the range of the mechanism. See
Proposition 2.
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Proof. Consider a SCR f that satisfies both WPO and WPD. Also, consider a
state R ∈ R and an outcome a ∈ A such that ∀i ∈ N,∀b ∈ A, aRib, so that the
premises of U are satisfied. If a ∈ f(R), then we are done. Suppose that this is
not the case. Then, since f(R) 6= ∅, there must exist an outcome c ∈ A such that
c ∈ f(R). Since ∀i ∈ N,∀b ∈ A, aRib, we must have that aRic. Now suppose that
∀i ∈ N, aPic. This however cannot be the case as WPO is violated. Therefore,
there must exist an agent j ∈ N such that aIjc. However, for all i ∈ N \ {j}
it holds that aRic. But then, WPD implies a ∈ f(R), a contradiction. This
completes the proof.
Next, we present the second part of our sufficient condition, a weakening of
HA, the Universally Worst Alternative. It is particularly useful as it is satisfied
in various interesting environments as shown in our applications section. We state
it formally below:
Universally Worst Alternative (UWA): ∃aW ∈ A, such that ∀R ∈ R,∀i ∈
N, ∀a ∈ f(R), aPiaW .
So, a UWA is strictly worse than any socially optimal outcome for any agent
and state and is never selected as socially optimal itself. It is easy to see that it
is implied by HA, as any HA is also a UWA10. Now, UWA, WPO and WPD
become sufficient for strong implementation when all agents are partially honest,
which is stated in our main theorem:
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. If a SCR f satisfies UWA,
WPO, and WPD, then it is strongly implementable.
Proof. See apendix.
Regarding the proof, we utilize the mechanism of Korpela (2013). Each agent
is called to announce an outcome, a state, a positive integer and whether she raises
a flag or not. We essentially show that because of Assumption 1, there cannot be
any strong equilibria where an agent is announcing a state different from the true
one, as in such a case, due to the nature of the outcome function, there would
exist profitable deviations motivated by partial honesty. Then, we show that our
conditions are sufficient to guarantee that a socially optimal outcome is a strong
equilibrium and that any strong equilibrium leads to a socially optimal outcome.
Several points are worth noting in this particular theorem. First, WPD con-
stitutes a significant weakening of the ASR which reduces to a Pareto related
10For other uses of UWA see Moore and Repullo (1990), or Jackson et al. (1994).
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condition. This is quite interesting since we were able to dispose of MON, or any
variation of it from our sufficient conditions. In fact, we only utilise “intra-state”
conditions, that is, conditions that restrict the socially optimal set with regards to
the same state, rather than “inter-state” ones. The second point to note is that
WPO is also a necessary condition for partially honest strong implementation,
given that the range of the mechanism coincides with the set of alternatives11. We
formally prove the statement in Proposition 2 below. Finally, notice that if we
only allow for linear orderings12, WPD holds trivially (Proposition 3) and it be-
comes redundant as a sufficient condition. Below we provide the formal statements
and appropriate proofs and in Corollary 1 we state a characterization theorem of
strongly implementable SCRs for the case of linear preferences when agents are
partially honest.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 hold and f be strongly implementable by a
mechanism G ∈ Γ∗. Then f satisfies WPO.
Proof. Let the premises hold. To derive a contradiction, suppose that f does not
satisfy WPO. This implies that for some R ∈ R, there exists a ∈ f(R) such that
a /∈ wPO(A,R). So, there must exist b ∈ A such that ∀i ∈ N, bPia. Now, since
f is strongly implementable, there exists a strong equilibrium s ∈ S such that
g(s) = a. So, ∀C ⊆ N,∀s′C ∈ SC , ∃j ∈ C, (sC , sN\C) Rj (s′C , sN\C). Since G ∈ Γ∗,
we are allowed to consider C = N and g(s′) = b. Then, we have that s Rj s′ and
for j it holds that:
• s ∼Rj s′ (1), or
• s Rj s′ (2)
If (1) holds, then g(s) = aIjb = g(s
′), but also bPja, a contradiction. If (2)
holds, we have either g(s) = aPjb = g(s
′) and bPja, a contradiction, or a =
g(s)Ijg(s
′), si ∈ TGj (R) and s′i /∈ TGj (R) which also contradicts bPja. So, our
initial statement that f does not satisfy WPO cannot hold. This completes the
proof.
Proposition 3. If RA = L, then any SCR f satisfies WPD.
The proof of Proposition 3 is straightforward, as one can notice that if there
exists an agent that is indifferent between a socially optimal alternative a and an
11This assumption is crucial for the necessity of WPO.
12Formally, let Li be the set of all linear, that is, complete, transitive and antisymmetric,
orders on A for each agent i and let L ≡ ×i∈NLi. Let the space of admissible preferences be
RA. So, in this case we set RA = L.
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outcome b, as dictated in the premise of WPD, then, by the linear preference
assumption, a must be equal to b and the condition holds vacuously. We are now
ready to proceed with our Corollary:
Corollary 1. Let RA = L and Assumption 1 hold. If a SCR f satisfies UWA,
then it is strongly implementable by a mechanism G ∈ Γ∗ if and only if it satisfies
WPO.
Proof. Immediate implication of Theorem 2 and Propositions 2 and 3.
Corollary 1 provides a characterization of the strongly implementable social
choice rules with linear preferences, when there exists a UWA and all agents
are partially honest. Essentially, in this case WPO is a necessary and sufficient
condition for strong implementation13.
5. Applications
In this section we provide applications of our Theorem 2. Our first applica-
tion is in pure matching environments, that is, one-to-one matching environments
where for every agent, staying unmatched is not feasible, or it is the worst possible
alternative in any state. For example, a manager in a firm might want to match
people from two groups with different abilities in pairs, in order to undertake
projects. In this case it might be reasonable to assume that staying unmatched is
not feasible (as it might lead to redundancies). We show that when all agents are
partially honest, the man-optimal (or woman-optimal) stable solution is strongly
implementable. This is to be compared with the results of Tadenuma and Toda
(1998), who show that with more than three agents in each group, while the whole
stable solution in pure matching problems is Nash implementable, no single-valued
subsolution of it is. Lombardi and Yoshihara (2017b) show that partial honesty
can resolve this issue for Nash implementation, as the man-optimal (or woman-
optimal) solution become Nash implementable in this case. With regards to strong
implementation, Shin and Suh (1996) present a mechanism for strong implementa-
tion of the stable rule in one-to-one matching problems and the implementability
of the stable rule in pure marriage problems is shown in Korpela (2013).
Our second application is in bargaining environments. We show that when
all agents are partially honest, the Nash bargaining solution is strongly imple-
mentable. In general, it is known that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash
implementable, due to the result by Vartiainen (2007). However, Lombardi and
Yoshihara (2017b) again show that it can be implemented with partial honesty.
Our results extend theirs to the strong equilibrium concept.
13We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us to the possibility of this characterization
theorem.
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5.1. Pure Matching Environments
We start by defining the formal pure matching environment. Let M,W be two
fixed finite sets, such that |M | = |W | ≥ 2 and M ∩W = ∅. For all i ∈ M , Pi is
a linear order on W ∪ {i}, and for all i ∈ W , Pi is a linear order on M ∪ {i}. A
matching is a function µ : M ∪W → M ∪W such that for any i ∈M ∪W the
following hold:
• i ∈M & µ(i) 6= i⇒ µ(i) ∈ W ,
• i ∈ W & µ(i) 6= i⇒ µ(i) ∈M , and
• µ(µ(i)) = i.
LetM be the set of all matchings. We now extend the relation Pi toM by defining
a new relation Ri as follows:
∀i ∈M ∪W, ∀µ, µ′ ∈M, µRiµ′ ⇐⇒ µ(i)Piµ′(i) or µ(i) = µ′(i)
Let the set of all preferences over M of each agent i be Ri. We then define
R ≡ ×i∈M∪WRi. As usual, R ∈ R denotes a preference profile. Now we make the
following assumption, which makes our environment one of pure matching:
Assumption 2: ∀m ∈M, ∀w ∈ W,∀µ ∈M, wPmm & mPww.
A solution (or SCR) is a correspondence ϕ : R ⇒ M such that for all
R ∈ R, ϕ(R) ⊆ M. A pair (m,w) ∈ M ×W blocks µ ∈ M in R ∈ R if
wPmµ(m) and mPwµ(w). A matching µ ∈ M is stable in R ∈ R, if there is
no pair (m,w) ∈M ×W such that (m,w) blocks µ in R. Let S(R) be the set of
all stable matchings in R ∈ R. The stable matching rule is a rule fS : R ⇒M
such that for every R ∈ R, fS(R) = S(R). We say that µM ∈ M is the man-
optimal stable matching in state R ∈ R if µM ∈ S(R) and for every µ′ ∈ S(R) and
m ∈M , we have that µM(m)Pmµ′(m), or µM(m) = µ′(m). The man-optimal sta-
ble rule fM is a function fM : R →M such that for every R ∈ R, f(R) = µM . In
a similar manner, we can define the woman-optimal stable matching and rule. We
now proceed by stating our possibility result for the pure matching environment.
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, the man-optimal stable
rule fM is strongly implementable.
Proof. It suffices to show that fM satisfies UWA, WPO and WPD,
Claim 1: fM satisfies UWA.
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Proof. By the construction of the pure matching environment, we have assumed
that staying single is the worst alternative for every i ∈ M ∪W . So, we can set
aW = µW , where for all i ∈M ∪W , µW (i) = i. So, our environment satisfies
UWA 14.
Claim 2: fM satisfies WPO.
Proof. Suppose not. Consider R ∈ R such that µ = fM(R) and suppose there
exists µ′ ∈ M with µ′ 6= µ such that ∀i ∈M ∪W,µ′(i)Piµ(i). Then, there exists
(m,w) ∈ M ×W such that µ′(m) = w 6= µ(m) and µ′(w) = m 6= µ(w). Conse-
quently, the pair (m,w) would block matching µ, which contradicts its stability.
Therefore, fM satisfies WPO.
Claim 3: fM satisfies WPD.
Proof. Consider R ∈ R and let fM(R) = µM . Now suppose there exists µ ∈ M
such that:
• ∃j ∈ N,µMIjµ, and
• ∀i ∈ N \ {j}, µRiµM
Since the man-optimal stable rule fM is a function, it suffices to show that µ = µM .
Now, without loss of generality let j = m ∈M . For m it holds that µImµM , which
implies µ(m) = µM(m). Let µ(m) = w. Then necessarily it must be the case
that µ(w) = µM(w) and thus µIwµ
M . Now if for all i ∈ M ∪ W \ {m,w} it
also holds that µ(i) = µM(i), then µ = µM and we are done. Suppose that this
is not the case. So, there exists i ∈ M ∪W \ {m,w} such that µ(i) 6= µM(i).
Again, without loss of generality, assume that i = m′ ∈M . Then, it must be that
µ(m′)Pm′µM(m′). Let µ(m′) = w′. Now, for w′ it is also true that m′Pw′µM(w′).
However, this contradicts the stability of the man-optimal stable matching µM ,
as the couple (m′, w′) would block it. Therefore, we conclude that µ = µM and
WPD holds.
By Claims 1, 2, 3 and Theorem 2, we have that the man-optimal stable solution
is strongly implementable. This completes the proof.
14The pure matching environment actually satisfies the stronger condition HA as shown in
Korpela (2013).
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5.2. Bargaining Environments
For the definition of the bargaining environment we chose to follow the work
of Vartiainen (2007), to whom we refer for the detailed formulation. Let N =
{1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players. The set of outcomes is A = {(a1, ..., an) ∈
Rn+|
∑n
i=1 ai ≤ 1}. Let the set of possible types of each agent i ∈ N be Θ. For each
θi ∈ Θ, vi(·, θi) : [0, 1] → R is agent i’s strictly monotonic and continuous utility
function. Let Θ0 be the normalized set of types for each i such that Θ0 = {θi ∈
Θ|vi(0, θi) = 0}. Let ∆ be the set of all probability distributions on A. So, for any
outcome p ∈ ∆ and agent i ∈ N , vi(p, θ) =
∫
A
vi(ai, θi)dp(a) is the utility function
of i defined on ∆. We also set the disagreement points d = 0. The Nash solution is
a SCR fN : Θn0 ⇒ ∆ such that ∀θ ∈ Θn0 , fN(θ) = argmaxp∈∆Πni=1vi(p, θi). Notice
that our environment satisfies UWA, since we have assumed strictly monotonic
utility functions and in any Nash solution all agents get positive amounts of the
good. This allows us to set aW = d = 0.
Proposition 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, the Nash solution fN is strongly
implementable.
Proof. Since the Nash solution satisfies weak Pareto optimality by definition, and
our environment satisfies UWA, it suffices to show only that fN satisfies WPD.
Claim 4: fN satisfies WPD.
Proof. Consider θ ∈ Θn0 such that p ∈ fN(θ). Now, let q ∈ ∆ be such that
∃j ∈ N, vj(q, θj) = vj(p, θj) and ∀i ∈ N \ {j}, vi(q, θi) ≥ vi(p, θi). If q = p, then
we are done. Suppose that q 6= p. If now for all i ∈ N \ {j} it is also the case that
vi(q, θi) = vi(p, θi), then it must be that q ∈argmaxp∈∆Πni=1vi(p, θi). Assume then
that there exists an i ∈ N \ {j} such that vi(q, θi) > vi(p, θi). But this contradicts
that p ∈ argmaxp∈∆Πni=1vi(p, θi). So, it is true that fN satisfies WPD.
By Claim 4, Theorem 2 and the fact that the Nash bargaining solution satisfies
UWA and WPO, we conclude that it is strongly implementable. This completes
the proof.
We have shown that the Nash solution satisfies our sufficient conditions and
is thus strongly implementable when all agents are partially honest. For this
result we relied on the ordinality of the environment. Note for example that U
is not satisfied by the egalitarian solution in an environment where interpersonal
comparisons are allowed, preferences are not strictly monotone and there is more
than one good15. This implies that our Theorem 2 cannot be applied in this case.
15For studies in bargaining theory in this type of environment see Roemer (1988).
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6. Concluding remarks
We have provided a sufficiency theorem for strong implementation when all
agents are partially honest. Our goal was to extend the positive results that have
been obtained in partially honest Nash implementation to the solution concept of
strong equilibrium. Our sufficient conditions are much stronger than in the case
of Nash implementation and this is due to the much more demanding solution
concept, as well as due to the attempt to provide simple sufficient conditions
rather than a complete characterization.
As applications of our main theorem, we showed that the man-optimal (or
woman-optimal) stable rule in a pure matching environment as well as the Nash
solution in a bargaining environment with strictly monotone preferences are both
strongly implementable when all agents are partially honest. However, as noted
before, both these rules are not strongly implementable when there are no partially
honest agents, therefore our results show the expansion of strongly implementable
rules when the motive of minimal honesty is assumed.
In our view, the applications of our theorems provide an insight into the pos-
sibilities that arise in implementation theory when non-consequentialist motives
are taken into account. They also emphasize the importance of procedural con-
cerns in mechanism design and social choice theory. An interesting problem for
further research which we aim to tackle, is closing the gap between our necessary
and suffficient conditions. In fact, the Non-emptiness condition of Dutta and Sen
(1991) is necessary in our case as well and we conjecture that it could constitute
part of a sufficient condition, given that the mechanism is appropriately modified.
In that way, the domain restriction of UWA could be avoided and more clear-cut
results could be obtained. Finally, along the same line, it would be intriguing to
study under which conditions partially honest strong implementation is equivalent
to strong implementation.
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Appendix
Mechanism
For the proof of Theorem 2 we will utilize the following mechanism G = (S, g):
For all i ∈ N , Si = A×R×{NF,F}×N+. The outcome function g is defined as
follows:
1) If ∀i ∈ N, si = (a,R,NF, ·) and a ∈ f(R), then g(s) = a.
2) If ∃C ⊂ N, ∀i ∈ N \ C, si = (a,R,NF, ·) with a ∈ f(R), and ∀j ∈ C, sj =
(aj, Rj, F, nj), then:
• If k = min{argmaxj∈Cnj} and ak ∈ ∪j∈CLj(a,R), then g(s) = ak
• Otherwise, g(s) = a
3) If ∀i ∈ N, si = (ai, Ri, F, ni), then k = min{argmaxj∈Nnj} and set g(s) = ak.
4) If none of the above apply, set g(s) = aW .
Proof of Theorem 2
We will show that any SCR f that satisfies our premises, namely UWA, WPO
and WPD can be implemented by mechanism G and we break the proof into two
parts:
Part 1: ∀R ∈ R, f(R) ⊆ SE(R)
Let the true state be R∗. Consider the strategy profile where ∀i ∈ N, si =
(a,R∗, NF, ·) and a ∈ f(R∗). If j ∈ N deviates to rule 2 she will obtain any
b ∈ Lj(a,R∗). So, g(Sj, sN\{j}) = Lj(a,R∗). If any C ⊂ N deviates to rule 2, the
obtained outcome will be in Lj(a,R
∗) for at least one j ∈ C. If N deviate to rule
3, there cannot be an improvement for all i ∈ N since f satisfies WPO. Finally,
there is no profitable deviation by any coalition to rule 4, since, by definition of
the UWA, aW is ranked strictly worse to any socially optimal outcome, by all
agents. Therefore, s is a strong equilibrium in R∗.
Part 2: ∀R ∈ R, SE(R) ⊆ f(R)
Let the true state be R∗. We proceed by first proving three useful claims:
Claim 1∗: There is no strong equilibrium under rule 1 where ∀i ∈ N,Ri 6= R∗.
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Proof. Suppose there exists a strong equilibrium under rule 1, where ∀i ∈ N, si =
(a,R,NF, ·) with a ∈ f(R) and R 6= R∗. By rule 1 the outcome is a. Then,
∀i ∈ N, si /∈ TGi (R∗), so, any i ∈ N can deviate to s′i = (a,R∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗)
inducing rule 2 while announcing the true state and not changing the outcome.
Therefore, s cannot be a strong equilibrium.
Claim 2∗: There is no strong equilibrium under rule 2 where ∃i ∈ N \ C such
that Ri 6= R∗.
Proof. Suppose there exists a strong equilibrium under rule 2 where ∃i ∈ N\C, si =
(a,R,NF, ·) with a ∈ f(R), R 6= R∗, and ∀j ∈ C, sj = (aj, Rj, F, nj) and let
g(s) = b. Then, we have that si /∈ TGi (R∗). We break the proof into two cases:
Case 1: |N \ C| ≥ 2
• If b = a: Then, since by definition a ∈ Li(a,R) holds, i can play s′i =
(a,R∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) with a sufficiently high integer without changing the
outcome and become strictly better off by Rule 2.
• If b 6= a: Then, again, since b ∈ ∪j∈CLj(a,R) it must hold that b ∈
∪j∈C∪{i}Li(a,R), so agent i can play s′i = (b, R∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) with a
sufficiently high integer without changing the outcome and become strictly
better off by Rule 2.
Case 2: N \ C = {i}
In this case i can play s′i = (b, R
∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) with a sufficiently high integer
without changing the outcome and become strictly better off by Rule 3.
Therefore, there is no strong equilibrium under rule 2, where for some i ∈
N \ C,Ri 6= R∗.
Claim 3∗: There is no strong equilibrium under rule 2 where ∃i ∈ C, withRi 6= R∗.
Proof. Suppose this is not the case, that is, there exists a strong equilibrium under
rule 2 such that ∃i ∈ C, with Ri 6= R∗. Also, by Claim 2∗, we have established
that in any strong equilibrium that falls in Rule 2, ∀j ∈ N \ C,Rj = R∗. So,
we consider a case where ∀j ∈ N \ C, sj = (a,R∗, NF, ·) with a ∈ f(R∗) and
∀k ∈ C, sk = (ak, Rk, F, nk) such that Rk 6= R∗ for some i ∈ C, that is, ∃i ∈ C
such that si /∈ TGi (R∗). Moreover, let g(s) = b. Now we take two mutually
exclusive cases:
Case 1: |C| ≥ 2
• If b = a, then, since we have that a ∈ Li(a,R∗) by definition, agent i can
play s′i = (a,R
∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) with a sufficiently high ni inducing rule 2
without changing the outcome and becoming strictly better off.
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• If b = al 6= a, where l = min{argmaxj∈Cnj}, we distinguish two cases:
– l 6= i: In this case, since al ∈ ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗), agent i can deviate to
s′i = (b, R
∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗), win the integer game for a sufficiently high
integer without affecting the outcome, and thus become better off by
rule 2.
– l = i: Again, al ∈ ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗), so i can play s′i = (b, R∗, F, ni) ∈
TGi (R
∗) and again become better off by rule 2.
Case 2: C = {i}.
• If b = a, then i can deviate to s′i = (a,R∗, NF, ·) ∈ TGi (R∗) inducing Rule 1
and become better off by announcing the truth.
• If b 6= a, then it must be that b = ai. So, since b ∈ Li(a,R∗), i can revert to
truth-telling by playing s′i = (b, R
∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) and become better off
by rule 2.
Therefore, there is no strong equilibrium under rule 2 where ∃i ∈ C such that
Ri 6= R∗.
Claim 4∗: There is no strong equilibrium under rule 3 where ∃i ∈ N , with Ri 6=
R∗.
Proof. Suppose there exists a strong equilibrium under rule 3 where ∀j ∈ N, sj =
(aj, Rj, F, nj), g(s) = b and let Ri 6= R∗ for some i ∈ N , that is, ∃i ∈ N such that
si /∈ TGi (R∗). Then, i can deviate to s′i = (b, R∗, F, ni) ∈ TGi (R∗) and obtain b
while announcing the true state R∗, for a sufficiently high integer ni. Therefore, s
cannot be a strong equilibrium.
Claim 5∗: There is no strong equilibrium under rule 4.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there exists one, namely s ∈ S, with g(s) =
aW . So, ∀C ⊆ N,∀s′C ∈ SC ,∃i ∈ C, (sC , sN\C) R∗i (s′C , sN\C). Consider the case
where C = N and let g(s′) = a ∈ f(R∗). Then, there exists i ∈ N such that:
• (sC , sN\C) Ri (s′C , sN\C) (1), or
• (sC , sN\C) ∼Ri (s′C , sN\C) (2).
Suppose (1) holds. Then, either g(s) = aWPia = g(s
′) ∈ f(R∗), which is a
contradiction of UWA, or g(s) = aW I
∗
i a = g(s
′) ∈ f(R∗), si ∈ TGi (R∗) and
s′i /∈ TGi (R∗), where we have a contradiction as well. If (2) holds, then g(s) =
aW I
∗
i a = g(s
′) ∈ f(R∗) and the same contradiction emerges. So, there is no strong
equilibrium under rule 4 and this completes the proof.
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Corollary 2. Any strong equilibrium s of the mechanism G, falls under rules 1-3
and it also holds that ∀i ∈ N,Ri = R∗.
Proof. Immediate implication of Claims 1∗-5∗.
By the above arguments, we can restrict attention to strong equilibria under rules
1, 2 or 3, where ∀i ∈ N,Ri = R∗. Consider a strong equilibrium under rule:
1. That is, ∀i ∈ N, si = (a,R∗, NF, ·). Then g(s) = a ∈ f(R∗).
2. That is, ∀i ∈ N \ C, si = (a,R∗, F, ·) with a ∈ f(R∗), and ∀j ∈ C, sj =
(aj, R∗, F, nj). Let g(s) = b. We distinguish two cases:
|N\C| ≥ 2: Then, it must be that ∀i ∈ N\C, g(Si, sN\{i}) = ∪j∈C∪{i}Lj(a,R∗)
and ∀j ∈ C, g(Sj, sN\{j}) = ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗), from Rule 2. For s to be a strong
equilibrium, it must hold that ∀i ∈ N \ C,Li(a,R∗) ⊆ ∪j∈C∪{i}Lj(a,R∗) ⊆
Li(b, R
∗) and, ∀j ∈ C,Lj(a,R∗) ⊆ ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗) ⊆ Lj(b, R∗). So, for any
i ∈ N we have that Li(a,R∗) ⊆ Li(b, R∗). However, since a ∈ f(R∗), from
WPO, it cannot be the case that ∀i ∈ N, bP ∗i a. So there must exist j ∈ N
such that aI∗j b. From WPD it follows that b ∈ f(R∗).
N \C = {i}: Then, for i it must hold that g(Si, sN\{i}) = A from rule 3, and
∀j ∈ C it must hold that g(Sj, sN\{j}) = ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗) by rule 2. For s to be
a strong equilibrium, it must hold that ∀i ∈ N \ C,Li(a,R∗) ⊆ A ⊆ Li(b, R∗)
and ∀j ∈ C,Lj(a,R∗) ⊆ ∪j∈CLj(a,R∗) ⊆ Lj(b, R∗). So for all i ∈ N it
holds that Li(a,R
∗) ⊆ Li(b, R∗). As before, from WPO and the fact that
a ∈ f(R∗), there must exist j ∈ N such that aI∗j b. Again, from WPD we
must have that b ∈ f(R∗).
3. That is, si = (a
i, R∗, F, ni), ∀i ∈ N and let g(s) = b. Then, ∀i ∈ N , it must
hold that g(Si, sN\{i}) = A. Now, for s to be a strong equilibrium it must be
that ∀i ∈ N,A ⊆ Li(b, R∗). Then, from WPO, WPD and Proposition 1, it
must hold that b ∈ f(R∗).
This completes the proof.
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